Brooklyn Journal of International Law
Volume 31 | Issue 3

Article 3

2006

Montesquieu on Commerce, Conquest, War and
Peace
Robert Howse

Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil
Recommended Citation
Robert Howse, Montesquieu on Commerce, Conquest, War and Peace, 31 Brook. J. Int'l L. (2006).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil/vol31/iss3/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Journal of
International Law by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.

MONTESQUIEU ON COMMERCE,
CONQUEST, WAR, AND PEACE
Robert Howse*
I. INTRODUCTION: COMMERCE AS THE AGENT OF PEACE: MONTESQUIEU
AND THE IDEOLOGY OF LIBERALISM

I

n the history of liberalism, Montesquieu, who died two hundred and
fifty years ago, is an iconic figure. Montesquieu is cited as the
source of the idea of checks and balances, or separation of powers, and
thus as an intellectual inspiration of the American founding.1 Among
liberal internationalists, Montesquieu is known above all for the notion
that international trade leads to peace among nation-states. When liberal
international relations theorists such as Michael Doyle attribute this position to Montesquieu,2 they cite Book XX of the Spirit of the Laws,3 in
which Montesquieu claims: “The natural effect of commerce is to bring
peace. Two nations that negotiate between themselves become reciprocally dependent, if one has an interest in buying and the other in selling.
And all unions are based on mutual needs.”4
On its own, Montesquieu’s claim raises many issues. Montesquieu’s
point is that trade based on mutual dependency discourages war. Here,
Montesquieu abstracts entirely from the relative power of the states in
question, a concern that is pervasive in his concrete analyses of relationships among political communities. For example, later on in the same
section of the Spirit of the Laws he mentions that trade relations between
Carthage and Marseille led to jealousy and a security conflict:
There were, in the early times, great wars between Carthage and Marseille concerning the fishery. After the peace, they competed in economic commerce. Marseille was all the more jealous, that, while equal
to its rival in industry, it was becoming inferior in power. Thus the reason for its great loyalty to the Romans. The war the Romans fought
against the Carthaginians in Spain was a source of riches for Marseille,

* Alene and Allan F. Smith Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.
1. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison). See also HARVEY C. MANSFIELD,
JR., TAMING THE PRINCE: THE AMBIVALENCE OF THE MODERN EXECUTIVE POWER 214
(1989).
2. Michael W. Doyle, Liberal Internationalism: Peace, War and Democracy,
http://nobelprize.org/peace/articles/doyle/index.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2006).
3. All citations to the Spirit of the Laws are by book and chapter number. The translations are my own, based on the French text in BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, 2 OEUVRES
COMPLETES: DE L’ ESPRIT DES LOIS [2 COMPLETE WORKS: SPIRIT OF THE LAWS] (Roger
Caillois ed., Gallimard 1951) (1748).
4. Id. bk. XX, ch. 2.
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which served as a supply port. The ruin of Carthage and Corinth increased still more the glory of Marseille. And, but for the civil wars,
where it was necessary to close one’s eyes and choose a side, it would
have been happy under the protection of Romans, who were not jealous
of its commerce.5

Montesquieu claims that commerce can cure “destructive prejudices”
and render manners (moeurs) gentle.6 But he also, and equally emphatically, suggests that prejudices and ferocious manners impede or prevent
commerce: “[In the case of the Romans and the Parthians] far from there
being commerce, there wasn’t even communication: ambition, jealousy,
religion, hatred, manners kept everything apart.”7 Does not then the disease itself prevent the proposed cure?
In the opening of the Spirit of the Laws, Book I, which sets out the
view of human nature on which the work is premised, Montesquieu presents human beings as naturally timid and non-conflictual, while it is
social dependency and interdependency that lead to aggression, distrust
and conflict.8 Why then should conflict not be engendered by trade dependency or interdependency? For Judith Shklar, Montesquieu’s meaning is that commerce and conquest are alternative means of satisfying the
needs of a state: “Commerce is the object of free states, while conquest is
the aim of despotic ones and, as [Montesquieu] knew, all continental
monarchies as well.”9 Yet, Montesquieu himself seems at least as much
impressed with the extent to which conquest and colonialism (and indeed
even genocide and mass exile) went hand in hand with the development
of commerce, at least historically. He goes so far as to suggest: “The history of commerce is that of the communication of peoples. Their various
destructions, and the displacement and devastation of population groups,
are its greatest events.”10 Elsewhere, Montesquieu states that the conquests of Egypt and India by Alexander the Great were among the events
that made a great revolution in commerce, and he asks whether “it [is]
necessary to conquer a country in order to have commerce with it.”11
For those who are inclined to reduce philosophy to a set of slogans,
Montesquieu is a dangerous thinker to cite and an impossible one to understand. There is hardly a generalization in his Spirit of the Laws that is
not qualified or contradicted by another generalization, or put in question
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Id. bk. XXI, ch.11.
Id. bk. XX, ch. 1.
Id. bk. XXI, ch. 16.
Id. bk. I, chs. 2–3.
JUDITH N. SHKLAR, MONTESQUIEU 107 (1987).
MONTESQUIEU, supra note 3, bk. XXI, ch. 5.
Id. bk. XXI, ch. 8.
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by Montesquieu’s own examples. Despite Montesquieu’s own insistence
in the preface that the work has a plan or design, Montesquieu’s manner
of proceeding through self-correction (or, less charitably, selfcontradiction) has led some illustrious readers to complain of its disorganization.12
While, as already noted, liberals consider Montesquieu a “liberal,” his
liberalism is seductive and subversive rather than moralistic and revolutionary. Montesquieu does not recommend the replacement of an illegitimate order, the ancien regime, by a legitimate regime. He is not a
precursor of the (bourgeois) French Revolution, and a strain in French
scholarship and political theory thus regards him as a reactionary, an
aristocrat defending class interests.13 Montesquieu is critical of every
kind of political regime, however liberal, and on the other hand, is fatalistic about power and constraint as endemic in the human condition. For
Montesquieu, liberty is not seized in a single stroke that replaces the regime of Throne and Altar with the regime of rights, but is to be found in
the margins of the actual power relations and, above all, in the subtle
transformation of those relations from dangerous and illiberal forms of
dependency into more benign and gentle forms of mutual dependency.
While leading, in some circles, to the view of Montesquieu as a reactionary, this way of thinking led Louis Althusser to view Montesquieu, in
some respects, as a (defective or inconsistent) precursor of a certain kind
of Marxist social theory.14
II. WAR AND CONQUEST: BOOKS IX AND X OF THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS
Montesquieu elaborates his views on war and peace prior to his systematic consideration of commerce in Books XX and XXI of the Spirit of
the Laws. He begins his discussion of defensive force in Book IX with
the proposition that all regimes, whether republican, aristocratic or monarchic, are subject to the same dilemma: if they are small, they will be
destroyed by external force, whereas if they are large they will be destroyed by “internal vice.”15 While carefully prepared by Montesquieu’s
dissections in Part I of the Spirit of the Laws of the internal contradic-

12. For a review of the different readings of Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws, see
RAYMOND ARON, LES ÉTAPES DE LA PENSÉE SOCIOLOGIQUE [STAGES OF SOCIOLOGICAL
THOUGHT] 61–66 (1967).
13. See id. 62–63.
14. See LOUIS ALTHUSSER, POLITICS AND HISTORY: MONTESQUIEU, ROUSSEAU, HEGEL
AND MARX (Ben Brewster trans., 1972).
15. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 3, bk. IX, ch. 1.
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tions that plague both ancient republics and modern monarchies,16 Montesquieu’s bold statement at the outset of Book IX that no regime can
combine internal health and effective external defense represents an arresting indictment of the entire tradition of political philosophy. The
search for the best regime, meaning the best “city” or the best “state,” the
best “closed” political community,17 is utterly futile. The achievement of
sound internal governance merely leads to vulnerability and ultimate destruction by external force. Only a despot can act fully consistently in
internal and external affairs.
While most commentators assume that, for Montesquieu, England is
the model of the ideal constitution or regime,18 Montesquieu in no way
exempts England from his verdict. Montesquieu understands political
liberty not in terms of citizenship and formal rights of political participation, but in terms of each individual’s sense of personal security and the
“tranquility of spirit” that flows from it: “the government must be such
that a citizen cannot fear another citizen.”19 But, if liberty is really this
“tranquility of spirit,” then no single political regime can guarantee liberty, even if it creates an order where one does not fear one’s fellow citizens, because no single political regime can guarantee against external
aggression. There are external threats to this “tranquility of spirit” that
are as menacing as internal threats; as Montesquieu demonstrates in the
many examples he presents in the Spirit of the Laws, throughout history,
the lives and property of individuals have been destroyed as much
through external conflict as internal oppression.
But, in Book IX, Montesquieu does suggest that there is a form of political association that can combine internal good governance with effective external defense: a republican federation.20 This is a “society of societies” that results from the merging of previously sovereign political
16. Ancient republics are maintained by “virtue”—an almost fanatical overcoming of
private interest for the sake of the common good, of which military virtue is the peak—
but even this virtue is not enough to guarantee that a small republic will be able to defend
itself against a larger power, especially one with the latest military technology. Once a
republic becomes large, however, private ambition and interest declare themselves: “interests become particular; a man feels first of all that he can be happy, great, glorious,
without his homeland; and soon he can be great alone, on the ruins of his homeland.” Id.
bk. VIII, ch. 16. On the other hand, when a monarchy covers a large territory, it is difficult to assure the obedience of the officials, lords, etc., that are required to administer the
parts of this large territory, since they operate far from the capital. Because of this problem, a large monarchy tends to degenerate into a despotism. Id. bk. VIII, ch. 17.
17. Id. bk. I, ch. 3.
18. See, e.g., MANSFIELD, supra note 1, at 230.
19. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 3, bk. XI, ch. 6.
20. Id. bk. IX, ch. 1.
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bodies (corps politiques).21 Montesquieu credits the form of republican
federation with the fact that in Europe, Holland, Germany and Switzerland have been able to become “eternal republics.”22 At first, Montesquieu suggests that the model of a republican federation can only work if
the entities that form the federation are themselves republics: “The spirit
of monarchy is war and aggrandizement; the spirit of the republic is
peace and moderation. These two types of governments cannot co-exist
in a republican federation, except in a forced manner.”23 But, Montesquieu then mentions an institutional innovation that can solve this difficulty: Germany is in fact composed of both former principalities and free
cities.24 This is possible because Germany has given itself a “chief,” a
leader of the federation as a whole.25
The existence of an independent level of governance at the federal
level demarcates the republican federation from confederations such as
the ancient Greek leagues, which proved unstable and ultimately not
“eternal.”26 Removing the obstacle created by the mixed nature of the
regimes of the different members of a republican federation, the possibility of this federal level of governance eliminates the only constraint explicitly mentioned by Montesquieu on the capacity of a republican federation “to expand through new associates united with it.”27 Montesquieu, who emphasizes throughout the Spirit of the Laws the relationship
between domestic laws and factors such as climate and culture, does not
apparently consider these factors as fatal to the merging of societies into
a republican federation. Far from his ultimate teaching being one of relativism or determinism, Montesquieu’s detailed examination of the particularities of domestic laws in their relation to the local, by giving the
local its due, allows one to believe that the local and the particular can
co-exist with a (potentially) universal legal system. The differences in
laws produced by the effects of climate, local culture, geography, etc.,
can be handled through a federal union, either through complete devolution of regulation in areas where these factors are naturally determinative, or through subsidiarity (room to deviate from, or adjust federal law
to reflect local contingencies).
By attributing differences in the laws to fixed particularities such as
climate, Montesquieu is usually regarded as taking the side of difference
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id.
Id.
Id. bk. IX, ch. 2.
Id.
Id.
See id. bk. IX, ch. 1.
Id.
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against that of universality, and thus as the precursor of historicism.28 On
the contrary, he is preparing the ground for a certain kind of universalism
by attributing the particularities of domestic or local laws to factors other
than unbridgeable divides of belief and value, conflicting gods and demons—to use Max Weber’s turn of phrase—which would make it impossible for different peoples to live together in peace. Montesquieu is
perhaps the original thinker of “path dependency”: within each political
community the laws reflect a dynamic relation between the form of government and other factors that, historically, would naturally have influenced lawmaking in that particular setting (climate, etc.).29 There is a
diversity of laws, both over time and among different political communities at a given time, which would at face value make any project depending on legal harmonization or integration seem utterly unrealistic. However, differences in laws that are attributable to “path dependency” of
individual societies may well be tractable to degrees of harmonization.
Once one understands legal differences as the consequence of the different “paths” that particular societies have taken, rather than as expressions
of conflicting ideals of government, they ought to be negotiable in the
service of the project of federation.
Thus, in looking at the laws as they have developed historically in the
different ideal types of regime—monarchy, republicanism/democracy,
aristocracy—Montesquieu shows that the actual differences in laws are
not so much a product of the ideal type of government as of the interaction of that ideal type with many accidental and contingent factors. Understood as legal integration, the merging of a monarchy with a republic,
for example, is something very different than the attempt to wed together
two conflicting ideal forms of government. We must face diversity and
understand it, in order to overcome it as an obstacle to universal legality,
and further understand that universal legality can entail something less
than full homogenization of positive law, i.e., accommodating differences that are non-threatening to the “spirit” of the laws.
Admittedly, Montesquieu attributes some particularities of laws to differences in religious convictions in different societies, but these differences, for Montesquieu, usually amount to “prejudices” or “superstition,”
which are susceptible to being removed as interaction between peoples
and individuals increases, whether through commerce, immigration or
28. Shklar, for instance, finds it difficult to reconcile Montesquieu’s apparent “universalism” in the condemnation of oppression with his apparently deterministic view of
law. SHKLAR, supra note 9, at 96–98.
29. For an overview of the concept of “path dependency,” see Paul A. David, Path
Dependence, Its Critics, and the Quest for ‘Historical Economics’ (2000), http://
129.3.20.41/eps/eh/papers/0502/0502003.pdf.
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intermarriage. It is notable that the distinctive domestic laws criticized by
Montesquieu as fanatical or against nature tend to be attributed by him to
prejudice, not to the kinds of local factors that might explain “reasonable” differences between laws. These are laws that deserve to be removed even by imperial conquest. Such laws are presented by Montesquieu as even less “reasonable” than despotism.
Montesquieu’s remarks about war and conquest in Books IX and X
must be understood in light of his dramatic presentation of a continuously expanding republican federation as the only adequate solution to
the problem of politics. He begins with the proposition that between “nations” the use of offensive force is “regulated” by the ius gentium.30 Under the ius gentium, the legitimate use of offensive force is based on the
natural right of self-preservation. However, the right of self-preservation
in the case of peoples results in a broader scope for the use of force than
in the case of individuals. An individual can only exercise the right of
self-defense on those “immediate occasions where he would be lost if he
waited for the assistance of the laws.”31 In the case of societies, the effectiveness of the right of self-defense depends largely upon the possibility
of pre-emption. Even in time of peace, where another society has acquired the power to destroy it, a society must be able to attack preemptively; the law, including the police, cannot be counted on to intervene to
prevent the destruction of the weaker power by the (now) stronger one.32
Following Thucydides here, Montesquieu suggests that any peace among
nations is intrinsically unstable; the temptation of states to exploit peace
to increase their (relative) power is in the nature of things, and irresistible
for certain regimes.33 This leads to insecurity on the part of other states
and a (justifiable) collapse of the peace. Only if international law were
able to equalize power between states could this insecurity be avoided,
and the right to preemption legitimately narrowed or limited to situations
of immediate attack. In a world of sovereign states, significant differences in relative power appear to Montesquieu as inevitable. By contrast,
a republican federation is well suited to integrating both small and large
states and mediating the implications of differences in size peacefully,
through federal institutions.34
30. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 3, bk. X, ch. 1.
31. Id. bk. 10, ch. 2.
32. Id.
33. According to Thucydides, the truest cause of the Peloponnesian War was the
growth of Athenian power, which made other cities, and eventually Sparta itself, insecure. THUCYDIDES, THE HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 15 (Richard Crawley
trans., 1874).
34. See MONTESQUIEU, supra note 3, bk. IX, ch. 3.
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In a remarkable single stroke, Montesquieu endorses the right to conquest as a necessary implication of the right to self-preservation. He
bluntly accepts the possibility that the only way of countering the security threat that led to the use of force in the first place is to conquer and
colonize the enemy. However, through grounding the right to conquest in
the natural right of self-preservation, Montesquieu places a set of derivative legal constraints on the manner in which the right to conquest may
be exercised. Strategies such as the destruction or enslavement of the
conquered people are contrary to the natural right of self-preservation;
they are only justifiable if there is no other means of eliminating the security threat posed by the conquered people. At the same time, the exercise of the right to conquest, which at the end of the chapter Montesquieu
qualifies as a “necessary, legitimate and unfortunate (malheureux)” right,
“always leaves an immense debt to be paid, to vindicate oneself before
human nature.”35 The ideal way of paying this debt, in the case of a republic, is to provide the conquered state with good administration and
good civil laws.36
Moreover, conquest can “destroy harmful prejudices” that may be an
obstacle to different peoples being integrated or living together in a single political community.37 Here, Montesquieu gives two examples: the
peace treaty that Gelon made with the Carthaginians, which prohibited
the practice of burning children, and Alexander the Great’s prohibition
on the Bactrians sending their elderly parents to be eaten alive by big
dogs. Alexander’s interdiction, Montesquieu tells us, was a “triumph that
he won over prejudice.”38
Alexander provides Montesquieu’s model for benign or beneficial
conquest and empire:39
He resisted those who wanted him to treat the Greeks like masters, and
the Persians like slaves; he thought only of uniting the two nations, and
making the distinction between conquering and conquered people disappear. He abandoned, after the conquest, all the prejudices that had
served him in conquering. He adopted the manners (moeurs) of the Per-

35. Id. bk. X, ch. 4.
36. Cf. id. bk. X, ch. 9.
37. Id. bk. X, ch. 4.
38. Id. bk. X, ch. 5.
39. Alexander the Great’s significance for Montesquieu is noted by Catherine Larrère, who comments that “Alexander thus becomes the image of modernity found in the
midst of ancient ages . . . .” Catherine Larrère, Montesquieu on Economics and Commerce, in MONTESQUIEU’S SCIENCE OF POLITICS: ESSAYS ON THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 335, 354
(David W. Carrithers et al. eds., 2001).
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sians, in order not to make them discontent with taking the manners of
the Greeks . . . .40

Alexander encouraged mixed marriages, a practice of which Montesquieu approves in other contexts as well. “After a certain passage of
time, all of the constituent elements of the conquering state are connected
to those of the conquered state, by customs, intermarriage, law, associations and a certain conformity of spirit.”41 This renders trust and peace
possible based on equality between the peoples and the individuals who
constitute them, and servitude of the conquered people definitively unnecessary to ensure the security of the conquering society. By degrees,
empire is transformed into republican federation; the obstacle to republican federation that Montesquieu flagged in Book IX:III—namely, that
sovereign states of equal power, jealous of their sovereignty, are unlikely
to be inclined to surrender it to federative power—does not prevent an
empire from becoming a republican federation.42

40. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 3, bk. X, ch. 14.
41. Id. bk. X, ch. 3.
42. Here, I have been influenced in my interpretation by Alexandre Kojève. Kojève
cites the very same practice of Alexander the Great emphasized here by Montesquieu as
the original model for the creation of the Universal and Homogenous State, a federal
juridical order capable, in principle, of encompassing the entire world. According to Kojève:
What characterizes the political action of Alexander in contrast to the political
action of all of his Greek predecessors and contemporaries, is that it was guided
by the idea of empire, that is to say of a universal State, at least in the sense that
this State had no a priori given limits (geographical, ethnic, or otherwise), no
pre-established “capital,” not even a geographically and ethnically fixed center
destined to exercise political dominion over its periphery. To be sure there have
at all times been conquerors ready to extend the realm of their conquests indefinitely. But as a rule they sought to establish the same type of relation between conquerors and conquered as that between Master and slave. Alexander,
by contrast, was clearly read to dissolve the whole of Macedonia and of Greece
in the new political unit created by his conquest, and to govern this unit from a
geographical point he would have freely (rationally) chosen in terms of the new
whole. Moreover, by requiring Macedonians and Greeks to enter into mixed
marriages with “Barbarians,” he was surely intending to create a new ruling
stratum that would be independent of all rigid and given ethnic support.
Alexandre Kojève, Tyranny and Wisdom, in LEO STRAUSS, ON TYRANNY 135, 170 (Victor Gourevitch & Michael S. Roth eds., rev. and expanded ed. 2000) (emphasis added).
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III. LUXURY COMMERCE AND ECONOMIC COMMERCE
Montesquieu’s view of commerce and its relation to war and conquest
depends on a crucial distinction that he draws between the commerce of
luxury and economic commerce. The commerce of luxury serves the
needs of the few and, above all, the political elite.43 Unlike economic
commerce, it is not so much based on reciprocity and competitive advantage as on the fantastic consumption demands of a small ruling class,
which cannot be satisfied within the boundaries of the community that
they rule. The commerce of luxury is entirely consistent with the spirit
of the conquerors—and indeed of despotism—as Montesquieu shows in
his discussion of Portugal and China.44 The commerce of luxury that is
based on conquest and empire is exploitative; it is not economically rational in the sense of being conducive to the general economic welfare
either in the conquering or the conquered state. Montesquieu uses the
example of the colonial commerce of Spain:
It is a bad kind of wealth . . . which does not depend on the industry of
the nation, the number of inhabitants, nor the cultivation of the earth.
The king of Spain, who receives great sums from his customs house in
Cadiz, is in this respect but a very rich individual in a very poor state.
Everything passes directly from the foreigners to himself without his
subjects having any part; this commerce is independent of the good or
bad fortune of his kingdom.45

Montesquieu explains the difference between the commerce of luxury
and economic commerce in the following way:
Commerce is related to the constitution. In an autocracy, it is usually
based on luxury, and whatever it may do to serve real needs, its principal object is to procure for the nation engaged in it everything that can
serve the vanity, whims and fantasies of the ruler. In a mixed regime, it
is more often based on economy. Merchants, who keep an eye on all
the nations of the earth, bring to one what they take from another.46

Economic commerce is, in its origin, the commerce of the impoverished, the powerless, and the oppressed. People who either lack a fertile
territory or have been deprived of their territory (Montesquieu mentions
Jews and other displaced peoples) manage through work to create something of value to others, which can then be traded to meet the basic needs

43.
44.
gal).
45.
46.

MONTESQUIEU, supra note 3, bk. XX, ch. 4.
Id. bk. VII, ch. 6 (discussion of China); id. bk. XX, ch. 20 (discussion of PortuId. bk. XXI, ch. 22.
Id. bk. XX, ch. 4.
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of self-preservation.47 Whereas the logic of the commerce of luxury is
taking something of value from others in order not to have to make it
oneself, economic commerce is based on helping oneself through industry that gives something of value to others. Montesquieu says of Marseille:
The barrenness of the terrain led its citizens to economic commerce.
They had no choice but to be hardworking, to provide what nature had
denied; they had to be just in order to live among barbarian nations that
were the key to their prosperity, and to be moderate so that their government was always calm. . . . One has seen everywhere that violence
and conflict give birth to economic commerce, when human beings are
constrained to be refugees, in marshes, on islands, in the far reaches of
the ocean, and even its limits.48

Economic commerce is natural in the sense that it is based on actual
needs that human beings have as human beings, or closely rooted in
those needs (contributing to self-preservation, basic comfort and security). The commerce of luxury, by contrast, reflects the capacity of certain human beings to acquire material needs that are detached from nature, based on fantasies and prejudices.
This allows us to understand better Montesquieu’s remark that “[t]he
natural effect of commerce is to lead to peace.”49 This remark applies to
economic commerce: the reciprocity of natural human needs is served
through peaceful mutual dependency. In this kind of commerce the buying and the selling nation both receive something of which they are naturally needful. But commerce driven by luxury seeks to take what will
serve its fantastical needs from wherever that thing can be found, regardless of reciprocity. Where necessary, such taking may well be by force—
hence, conquest and exploitation.
As well, the commerce of luxury has quite different internal effects
than economic commerce. As Montesquieu suggests, the commerce of
luxury may leave the general population of a state worse off; if the commerce of luxury is not based on exploitation of other peoples through
conquest and colonialism, it may well be based on exploitation of one’s
own people. Montesquieu gives the example of Poland:
A few lords possess entire provinces; they press the workers so they
can have a greater quantity of wheat that they can send abroad and obtain the things that their luxury demands. If Poland had no trade with
any nation, these peoples would be happier. The powerful, who would
47. Id. bk. XX, ch. 5.
48. Id.
49. Id. bk. XX, ch. 2.
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having nothing but their wheat, would give it to the peasants in order to
live; too large domains being in their charge, they would share them
with their peasants; everyone would find leather and wool in their
flocks, there would no longer be an immense cost in the making of
clothing; the powerful, who always love luxury, and who could not find
it other than in their own country, would encourage the poor to work.50

It is the harshness of political rule and the lack of familiarity with the
“commodities of life”—and not climate or culture—that, for Montesquieu, best explains poverty in the South:
There are two types of poor peoples: those that the harshness of the
government has rendered such; and these are incapable of hardly any
virtue, because their poverty is part of their servitude; the others are
only poor for having disdained, or not having known the commodities
of life; and these can do great things, for their poverty is part of their
liberty.51

Poverty should not be associated with laziness or indolence as a hardwired cultural characteristic. Under exploitative political rule, people are
poor and idle not because such necessities as they require are available
without toil, but because their labor benefits not themselves but the luxurious tastes of their masters. In a “free” subsistence society, people are
poor and appear idle, not knowing or caring much about the “commodities of life”; they focus their energies elsewhere.
Montesquieu’s distinction between the commerce of luxury and economic commerce plays a major role in his analysis of the political morality of commerce and its legal regulation. In free societies, which are
characterized by economic commerce rather than the commerce of luxury, there is more, not less regulation of commerce than in societies
characterized by political servitude. “Freedom of commerce is not a capacity given to merchants to do what they want; that would more likely
be servitude. That which disadvantages the trader does not, for that, disadvantage trade.”52 Commerce can serve the interests of building national wealth and creating employment, but it may well not do so without
government regulation. An example that Montesquieu gives is that England prohibits the export of its wool.53 By such a prohibition, we can
surmise, England assures itself of a trade in cloth and clothing made
from English wool, which benefits the public interest more than a trade
in wool itself, because in addition to those employed in the production of
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. bk. XX, ch. 23.
Id. bk. XX, ch. 3.
Id. bk. XX, ch. 12.
Id.
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wool, England now has many who are employed in the production of
cloth and clothing for global markets.
The commerce of luxury, as opposed to economic commerce, tends
toward monopolies of trade in certain products or with certain countries.
Montesquieu is very critical of these kinds of restrictions, as well as the
granting of exclusive privileges to particular merchants or trading companies on certain routes of commerce: “The true maxim is to not exclude
any nation from one’s commerce without great reasons.”54 In fact, contestation of control or monopoly rights over commerce with a particular
country or region turns commerce into a zero-sum game, leading to jealousy, concern with relative gains, and possible military conflict.55 The
attempt of Spain and Portugal to stabilize this competition by dividing
the world into two commercial empires failed: “[T]he other nations of
Europe did not leave them in peace to enjoy their division: the Dutch
chased the Portuguese out of almost all of East Asia and various nations
made settlements in the Americas.”56 Montesquieu describes a world
where economic commerce is always susceptible to being frustrated both
by the ambition of political elites to co-opt it for their own needs—to
make it or remake it into the commerce of luxury57—and by the susceptibility of governments to give traders special privileges and monopolies
that limit the ability of commerce to spread wealth and employment
widely, both within states and globally.
IV. WAR, CONQUEST AND ECONOMIC COMMERCE
Although war and conquest often result in the disruption of economic
commerce58 and the expansion of luxury commerce through colonialism,
according to Montesquieu, war has also contributed positively to the development of economic commerce. First of all, as we have already discussed, war has resulted in peoples being displaced and put in a situation
of necessity that spurred their commercial spirit. Secondly, as Montesquieu emphasizes in his discussion of Alexander the Great—a central
figure in both the chapters of the Spirit of the Laws on war and conquest,
and those on commerce—conquest can lead to the discovery of routes of
navigation that open up new possibilities for economic commerce.59
Conquest can increase the knowledge of the world that is essential to
economic commerce, but often inhibited by religion and prejudice. And,
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
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finally, as Montesquieu had indicated in his discussion of Alexander the
Great in the chapters of the Spirit of the Laws on war and conquest, conquest can lead to intermixing of peoples and customs and the actual removal of prejudices that limit or inhibit communication between peoples,
including commerce.
The fact that war and conquest have actually spurred, or contributed to
the development of, economic commerce—even if they have also destroyed it in certain places and for certain periods of time—does not
really provide much support for the hope Montesquieu appears to hold
out, that commerce will lead to a stable peace. The pacific aims and
manners of people who engage in commerce may have the effect of making states dominated by such people less bellicose, but if other states regard commerce as a means of taking wealth to satisfy the needs of their
political and social elites, or as a zero-sum game for the world’s resources, why should economic commerce with its pacific aims and manners triumph? As Pierre Manent suggests, “After all, the benefits of commerce exemplified by [commercial peoples] only have a place in the
interstices of general violence sustained by traditional war-like politics,
politics as usual, and appear then to depend for their very existence on
this violence.”60
To appreciate Montesquieu’s answer to this objection, one should begin with his observation that trading peoples have responded to violence
by ingeniously protecting themselves against rapacious and bellicose
powers. Montesquieu’s example is that of “letters of exchange,” whose
invention Montesquieu attributes to the Jews.61 Through the storing of
wealth in intangible form, commerce “can elude violence.”62 The ability
of any individual state to suppress this transnational activity becomes
limited, and thus “[w]e have begun to cure ourselves of Machiavellianism, and we continue to cure ourselves day by day.”63 Absolute sovereignty shows itself as a myth, and the attempt by the sovereign to use
instruments of coercion to control that which exceeds the limits of his
territory shows itself as mere imprudence. Moreover, whereas in the past
commerce may have been dependent on the bellicose state and its conquests to chart previously unknown territory and open up routes of trade
and navigation, the means of doing so are now in the hands of the traders
themselves, thanks to the compass: “Today one discovers lands by sea
voyages; in early times, one discovered seas by the conquest of lands.”64
60.
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But “letters of exchange” surely depend upon trust, probity and perhaps legality (at least a lex mercatoria) for their effectiveness. They suggest the possibility of a legal order beyond a state or closed political
community, just as Alexander the Great’s model of “empire,” mixing
different peoples and their customs, suggests the possibility of a social
order beyond the state or closed political community.
By making sovereignty less effective, Montesquieu appears to suggest,
a transnational commercial order will also make it less attractive, at least
in the long run. And, just as the sovereign has been rendered less capable of depriving the transnational commercial class of its property and
profits, the sovereign cannot easily destroy their knowledge of different
lands and their customs. Knowledge of this kind allows a certain liberation from national or religious prejudice (which ultimately occurs, according to Montesquieu, due to ignorance of ourselves, i.e., our common
humanity, and can only be cured by knowing others). Commerce depends on knowing and trusting the other. The grounds for keeping peoples apart become questionable if such trust is possible. The practice of
commerce through trust and reciprocity implies a common language of
human needs and, minimally at least, of cooperation to meet those needs.
This is a different beginning point for understanding the problem of
social coordination than that adopted by the older political philosophers,
who sought to establish the legitimate or the best political order, or
closed political community. It is a beginning point closer to Montesquieu’s own in the Spirit of the Laws, which is a state of nature where
human beings are essentially oriented toward the satisfaction of basic
needs and where their sense of timidity or vulnerability precludes them
from imagining the idea of dominating others, even in order to satisfy
those basic needs. In the state of nature, vulnerability has the consequence of keeping human beings apart, not just of keeping them from
fighting. It thus precludes the arts of peace as well as of war. Commerce
represents the idea of human society based not upon rule or domination
but mutual neediness. Any closed society (chaque societe particuliere)
has the effect of making human beings forget their timidity or vulnerability, giving them the feeling of “force”65; they thus become war-like towards other closed societies and try to dominate one another on the inside. Commerce, by contrast (that is to say, commerce that is not itself
the product of the ambition and avarice of closed societies and their leaders), means the dependency on others for meeting one’s natural human
needs—the needs based in comfortable and secure self-preservation—or,
in short, the ground of social interaction. It does not lead to a sense that
65. Id. bk. I, ch. 3.
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one has the power to take from the other what one wants, but rather that
one must win it freely. This is illustrated by Montesquieu in identifying
the commercial spirit with the spirit of peoples who have not had a territorial state, or whose territorial state has been taken away from them.66
These peoples have been cured of—or are free of—the illusion of
“force” that comes from being in a closed, “sovereign” political community on a defined territory.
V. CONCLUSION
Commerce does not guarantee or secure peace in a world of sovereign
states; rather, commerce represents for Montesquieu an alternative to a
world of sovereign states, of closed political communities—a model of
peaceful social cooperation that requires laws and conventions, certainly,
but of a transnational, transpolitical kind. We now understand the meaning of Montesquieu’s notion that the model for law is not nomos (the
custom or way of a particular society or community) but something more
universal, a concept of order or structure that is prior to and more fundamental than nomos.67 However, while implicit in the idea of law, the
transnational, transpolitical order must be built out of the diverse nomoi
of existing political communities. Commerce, by illustrating how stateless merchants have maintained an order among themselves to sustain
exchange across the most diverse societies, helps point the way.
The first stage is indicated by the idea of a republican federation suggested in Book IX of the Spirit of the Laws. Montesquieu’s deepest practical intent is the federalization of closed political societies through legal
integration, with the laws chosen being those most favorable to freedom;
this is what informs his obsessive concern about the differences of positive laws and the sources of those differences. Perhaps we should not
project onto his sober spirit the actual project of world government or a
universal liberal society. But, without some such conception, his contentions about the relationship of commerce, war and peace collapse into a
set of contradictions, paradoxes and tautologies.

66. Id. bk. XX, ch. 5.
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